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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Landon Blake West appeals following the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress evidence obtained following the deployment of a drug dog during a traffic stop.
Mr. West asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that the traffic stop was
not unreasonably delayed, and, in the alternative, that any delay was justified by
reasonable suspicion that Mr. West had committed, or was about to commit, a crime.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. West was initially charged with possession of marijuana in an amount
exceeding three ounces and possession of drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.28-31 ).

Mr. West filed a motion to suppress, seeking the suppression of all evidence obtained
as a result of his illegal seizure, without reasonable suspicion, and the illegal search of
his vehicle, in violation of Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as all statements made after he
was questioned in the absence of Miranda 1 warnings, along with statements obtained
after Miranda warnings were provided. 2 (R., pp.51-52.)

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The district court did not rule on the issue of pre-Miranda statements, indicating that it
would "leave that up in the air pending further request of the parties." (Tr., p.84, Ls.813.) The parties do not appear to have requested a ruling on that issue. (See generally
R.) As such, this portion of the motion to suppress is not ripe for appeal. Furthermore,
because the bulk of Mr. West's incriminatory statements were made prior to the Miranda
warming, and a determination as to whether Mr. West's pre-Miranda statements should
have been suppressed was not made and cannot be challenged on appeal, there is little
value to challenging the district court's decision not to suppress post-Miranda
statements (Tr., p.84, Ls.3-5), it is not capable of meaningful review on appeal.
2

1

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Andreoli of the Boise Police
Department testified about his encounter with Mr. West that led to the instant charges.
Officer Andreoli explained that he first noticed Mr. West's car when he saw it backing
out of the driveway of "a possible drug house" in his patrol area. While following the
car, Officer Andreoli saw Mr. West fail to properly signal during a turn. 3 Officer Andreoli
then conducted a traffic stop, observing that Mr. West "was holding a freshly lit
cigarette" which, based on his experience, is "oftentimes" a sign that someone is
attempting "to mask odors, either on a subject or an odor inside the vehicle."

In his

experience, he has "had instances where a lit cigarette was used to mask the odor of
marijuana." (Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.11, L.6.)
Officer Andreoli noticed that Mr. West "appeared extremely nervous," with his
hand "visibly shaking as he handed me his documents."

Finally, Officer Andreoli

noticed that Mr. West "was wearing a necklace which appeared to be made of hemp"
with "a glass medallion that had the numbers four, two, zero on it." According to Officer
Andreoli, in his "training and experience" he knows "the number '420' to be known
amongst people who use marijuana as a universal time to smoke marijuana." (Tr., p.11,
L.7 - p.12, L.8.)
At that point, Officer Andreoli, while standing at the driver's side window, radioed
dispatch and requested that a drug dog be sent to the stop.

Officer Andreoli then

returned to his patrol car "and ran both Mr. West and his passenger through dispatch for
driver's license status as well as any active warrants, then began completing a citation

3

Defense counsel conceded that the initial traffic stop of Mr. West was justified. (Tr.,
p.56, Ls.2-4.)
2

for the insurance violation." 4

Officer Andreoli described the process of running

individuals through dispatch for driver's license status and warrants as follows:
However, when you go to the administration channel [as opposed
to the normal police radio channel], the administrative channel to run
driver's license and warrant checks, everybody in the valley - everybody
in Ada County is on one channel.
So I can't speak for this instance as far as what the waiting period
was. But, typically, you call in to dispatch with your designator and explain
to them that you are basically - tell them that you have two that you want
to run for license and warrant checks. We use codes and stuff like that for
radio purposes, but you basically tell them that you're there and you're
waiting. And then you have to wait for dispatch to come back to you and
let you know that you're the next in line, basically, before you can actually
run their information.
The way we run the information is last name first, and we typically
spell the last name using the phonetic alphabet. So, for Mr. West, it would
be "William, Edward, Sam. Tom," spelling that, and then spell his first
name if it's not a common name, and then provide a date of birth, and
then wait for dispatch again to come back and run the second individual.
And then dispatch would have to go through their computers - I
think there's two or three different computers they have to run through for
driver's license, for warrants, and then for any criminal record - before
they can relay that information back to you as an officer.
(Tr., p.38, L 18- p.39, L.23 (emphasis added).)
The drug dog, accompanied by his handler Deputy Clifford, arrived ten minutes
into the traffic stop while Officer Andreoli was still completing the traffic citation. Officer
Andreoli then discussed the situation with Deputy Clifford for approximately thirty
seconds before returning to the car and having Mr. West and his passenger exit the car.
Mr. West was then patted down for weapons, and "escorted back toward my patrol car
and asked to have a seat - excuse me - have a sit there on the curb nearby." Officer

4

The insurance card provided by Mr. West was expired. (Tr., p.13, Ls.2-6.)
3

Andreolf described Mr. West as "very compliant" with his requests.

(Tr., p.13, L.7 -

p.17, L.3.)
At that point, while the dog was sniffing the outside of Mr. West's car, Officer
Andreoli "was explaining to Mr. West what had led me to this point of the investigation
as far as utilizing a drug-certified canine." Officer Andreoli "asked him if he was aware
(of] what the '420' on his necklace signified; and he, in his own words, I believe stated
that it was a universal pothead time."

In response to Officer Andreoli's question

regarding whether there was anything in the car that he should be aware of before the
dog finds it, Mr. West asked - and was refused - permission to return to his vehicle to
retrieve something. Mr. West then told Officer Andreoli "that he had some marijuana
inside the vehicle, explained where it was at inside the vehicle, which was inside of a
backpack I believe on the front passenger side of the vehicle." By that time, however,
the drug dog had already found the item. 5
Defense counsel argued that the police unlawfully extended the duration of the
traffic stop to allow time for the drug dog to arrive, and that the time it took to call
dispatch and write out the citation was unreasonable. (Tr., p.52, L.14 - p.66, L.10.) In
response, the State argued that the "drug dog got there in the time period that was
legally permissible in a public area and then conducted the sniff. And so we don't need
to look to these reasonable articulable suspicions." (Tr., p. 70, L.24

p.71, L.3.) The

State then argued, in the alternative, that the officer had reasonable ariicuJable
suspicion based on the facts articulated by the officer. (Tr., p.72, L.15 - p.75, L.7 .)

5

After receiving his Miranda warnings, Mr. West admitted that he was a marijuana
dealer. (Tr., p.20, L.11 - p.22, L.3.) For the reasons set forth in note 2, supra, this is
not relevant to the only claim ripe for appeal.
4

Ultimately, the district court concluded that the length of the stop was not
unreasonable, "given what was going on with the writing of the citation and the calling in
the information on the two occupants of the motor vehicle."

The district court also

concluded "that the officer did, in fact, have a reasonably articulable suspicion that
something is afoot at the time he conducts this search [sic]." Specifically, the district
court explained that taking all of the facts articulated by the officer together, "it would be
reasonable for the officer to conduct a further investigation as to what is going on with
this defendant."

The district court then announced that it would not suppress the

evidence. (Tr., p.81, L.23 - p.84, L.1.)
Following the district court's denial of Mr. West's motion to suppress, he and the
State entered into a Rule 11 plea agreement under which he agreed to enter conditional
guilty pleas to charges of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to
deliver 6 and possession of drug paraphernalia, reserving the right to appeal the denial
of his motion to suppress, with the parties free to argue for any lawful sentence. (R.,
pp.142-45.)

Pursuant to the agreement, Mr. West entered pleas of guilty to both

charges. (R., p.146.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed,
on the possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with the intent to deliver
charge, retaining jurisdiction for a period of one year, and imposed a concurrent ninety
day sentence on the drug paraphernalia charge.

(R., p.147.)

Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.

6

Mr. West then filed a

(R., p.150.)

Following the

This charge was amended from possession of marijuana in an amount exceeding
three ounces in the State's Second Amended Information. (R., pp.125-26.)
5

completion of his rider, the district court suspended the balance of Mr. West's sentence,
and placed him on probation for a period of five years. (R., pp.171-72.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. West's motion to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution?

7

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. West's Motion To Suppress Evidence
Obtained In Violation Of Article I,§ 17 Of The Idaho Constitution And The Fourth
Amendment To The United States Constitution

A.

Introduction
Mr. West asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to

suppress evidence obtained in violation of Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution following the deployment of a
drug dog during the unlawful extension of a traffic stop because the duration of the
traffic stop was unreasonably extended and because the police did not have reasonable
suspicion to believe that Mr. West had committed, or was about to commit, a crime.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's
findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,
561 (Ct. App. 1996).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. West's Motion To Suppress
The Constitutions of both the United States and Idaho protect "[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 17. The purpose
of these constitutional provisions is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the
exercise of discretion by governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's

8

privacy and security against arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824
(Ct. App. 2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979)).

The

constitutions safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the
seizures of persons through detentions falling short of a formal arrest. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (68). The stop
of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of its occupants and is, therefore, subject to these
constitutional restraints.

State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208 (Ct. App. 1998).

A

vehicle stop is of limited magnitude compared to other types of seizures; however, it is
nonetheless a "constitutionally cognizable" intrusion and, therefore, may not be
conducted "at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials."

Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (79).
When the purpose of the detention is to investigate a possible traffic offense or
other crime, it must be based upon reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509 (Ct. App. 2001 ); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. 491, 498
(1983). Although the required information leading to formation of reasonable suspicion
in the mind of the police officer is less than the information required to form probable
cause, it still "must be more than mere speculation or a hunch on the part of the police
officer." State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2005). The reasonableness of
the officer's suspicion is evaluated based upon the totality of the circumstances at the
time of the seizure. Flower 131 Idaho at 208.
A routine traffic stop is normally limited in scope and of short duration; therefore,
it is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and, as such, is
analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prouse, 440

9

U.S. at 653-654. Under Terry, an investigative detention is permissible if it is based
upon specific aritculable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has
been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 21.
The question of whether an investigative detention is reasonable requires an
inquiry into both whether the officer's action was justified at the inception, and whether it
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361 (Ct. App. 2000). However, the
purpose of a stop is not fixed at the time the stop is initiated; a routine traffic stop might
turn up suspicious circumstances that justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the
stop. Id. at 362.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that an investigative detention
"must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop."

State v Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Florida v.

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983))

Further, an individual "may not be detained even

momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so."

Id.

In United

States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2001 ), the court held that "[f]urther detention

was not lawful after the point at which the purposes of the stop [were] resolved." Id. at
398.
It is therefore not necessarily a constitutional violation for an officer who has
stopped someone for a traffic violation to ask unrelated questions about drugs or to run
a drug dog around the outside of the vehicle.

State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 563

(Ct. App. 2005). Idaho Courts have held that the questioning and use of a drug dog
during a stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment when it does not extend the

10

duration of the stop beyond that which was necessary to address the traffic violation.
See State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852-853 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an officer's

request to search a car was lawful where the request was made before the issuance of
the traffic citation had been completed and such request lengthened the process only by
a second or two); see also Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362-363 (holding that it was
permissible for one officer to question a vehicle's driver about drugs and weapons and
to take a drug dog around the car while another officer was busy checking with dispatch
on the driver's status and writing out a traffic citation).
In contrast, the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that it was an unwarranted
intrusion upon the vehicle occupants' privacy and liberty for an officer to question a
driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose
of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651-653.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals concluded that a motorist had been unlawfully detained
where all routine traffic stop procedures had been completed when additional officers
arrived and then requested consent to search the vehicle. State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho
532 (Ct. App. 2000).
The question of whether the duration of the traffic stop was unreasonably
extended must be addressed first because, if it was not unreasonably extended, then no
constitutional violation could have occurred, regardless of the absence of reasonable
suspicion that Mr. West had committed, or was about to commit, a crime.
1.

The Duration Of The Traffic Stop Was Unreasonably Extended

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that it is not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment to request identification from the driver of a vehicle during an otherwise

11

lawful encounter and to verify, through a records check, the validity of that license.
State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 495-96 (1992) (relying, in part, on I.C. § 49-316, which

"requires a driver to surrender a driver's license to a police officer upon demand")
(emphasis added); see also State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 165 (Ct. App. 1984) ("Once
the [lawful] traffic stop had occurred, nothing in the fourth amendment would preclude
the officer from routinely asking the motorist to exhibit his driver's license, the vehicle
registration and an insurance certificate.") (emphasis added).
The issue with respect to checking the identities of otherwise innocent
passengers appears to turn on whether the request for identification extended the
length of the traffic stop.

In State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2004), the Idaho

Court of Appeals held that police did not unreasonably extend the duration of a traffic
stop when requesting the identification of a passenger when that request did not result
in a detention that is "any longer than if the officer had only identified the driver." The
Court's conclusion rested on the fact that one officer was identifying the driver while
another was simultaneously identifying the passenger, meaning that the request for the
passenger's information "did not extend the duration of the stop beyond the time
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 182 (Ct.
App. 2004).
With respect to obtaining and checking the status of a passenger during a traffic
stop for a driver's traffic violation, two courts have held that it does not violate the Fourth
Amendment to do so when the purpose of the officer doing so is to verify whether the
passenger will be able to operate the vehicle legally where the driver of the vehicle
either lacks a valid driver's license or will be otherwise unable to drive the vehicle; no

12

court appears to have addressed whether it may be done as a matter of routine. See
United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9 th Cir. 2007) (holding that

because the officer "wanted to learn not only who the passenger was in a stopped
vehicle, but also whether [the passenger] could drive the truck once Diaz was arrested"
asking for the passenger's identification did not "implicat[e] the Fourth Amendment")
(emphases added); see also United States v. Arreola-Delgado, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1240,
1247 (D. Kan. 2001) (officer "asking to see [passenger's] license and promptly checking
into its legal status

.. was related to the traffic stop upon learning that the driver

Vasquez did not possess a driver's license").
Because the State did not produce evidence that the passenger in Mr. West's
vehicle had committed a crime or violation necessitating identifying and checking the
passenger's status, and Mr. West's ability to operate the vehicle was not in question at
the time of the request and records check, the district court erred in finding that the
duration of the traffic stop was reasonable in light of the officer running both the driver's
and passenger's information through dispatch.
As testified to by the officer, running two names through dispatch requires two
requests of the dispatcher who must then search three separate computer systems to
check for warrants, license status, and criminal history on each person. (Tr., p.38, L.18
- p.39, L.23.) A review of the audio recording of the traffic stop reveals that verifying
with the passenger that the information on her requested license was still current took
several seconds (Defendant's Exhibit C, Track 2, 7 2:23 to 2:26), providing the

7

Defendant's Exhibit C is a CD-ROM disk containing three audio tracks. Only the
second track, "719 Andreoli, 07222010 2047 081234.dss" (hereinafter Track 2), is
relevant to the issue on appeal. The first, "719 Andreoli, 07222010 218 018234.dss,"
13

passenger's information to dispatch took another seventeen seconds (Defendant's
Exhibit C, Track 2, 5:12 to 5:29), and receiving word back that the passenger's license
was valid took another four seconds. 8 (Defendant's Exhibit C, Track 2, 6:24 to 6:28.)
At least another sixty seconds was spent explaining why the drug dog was called out,
having both Mr. West and the passenger exit the vehicle, requesting consent for - and
conducting - a pat down of Mr. West, and asking the passenger whether she was in
possession of any weapons.

(Defendant's Exhibit C, Track 2, 11 :30 to 13:02.)

Additionally, Officer Andreoli spent several seconds requesting that the drug dog be
called out before contacting dispatch to run checks on Mr. West and the passenger.
(Defendant's Exhibit C, Track 2.)
handler on the situation,

Furthermore, the time it took to brief the drug dog

estimated

to be thirty seconds (Tr.,

p.15,

Ls.5-16),

impermissibly extended the duration of the traffic stop. As such, the district court erred
when it denied Mr. West's motion to suppress on this basis.
2.

The Police Lacked Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion To Justify Extending
The Traffic Stop To Await The Arrival Of The Drug Dog

Mr. West asserts that the reasonable, articulable suspicion needed to justify the
expansion of the scope and duration of an ordinary traffic stop requires that the officer
have such suspicion for a specific crime. See Terry, 391 U.S. at 6, 23 (1968) (officer
suspected Terry and his co-defendant of casing a store to commit an armed robbery,

consists of a conversation between Officer Andreoli and the passenger along with the
arrest of Mr. West. The third, "719 Andreoli, 07222010 2121 018234.dss," consists of a
conversation between Mr. West and Officer Andreoli in which Mr. West consents to a
search of the contents of his cell phone. (Defendant's Exhibit C.)
8
This does not include the time that it took to run the passenger's information, it only
includes the time that it took for dispatch to announce, via the radio, that the
passenger's license was valid.
14

with Supreme Court explaining, "[i]t would have been poor police work indeed for an
officer of 30 years' experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same
neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior further"); Royer, 460 U.S. at
498 ("[C]ertain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is
articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.")
(emphasis added).
In this case, the fact that Mr. West was leaving a suspected drug house, smoking
a recently lit cigarette, appeared nervous, and was wearing a piece of hemp jewelry with
a commonly-known marijuana reference did not provide reasonable suspicion that he
had committed, or was about to commit, a specific crime justifying extending the
duration of the traffic stop to allow for the arrival of a drug dog. See State v. Zuniga,
143 Idaho 431 (Ct. App. 2006) (no reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory
detention when police observed a man exit a house know for drug activity and man
appeared nervous upon contact with the police).
Officer Andreoli did not testify as to what crime he suspected that Mr. West had
committed or was about to commit. (See generally Tr.) Furthermore, even assuming
that the facts gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Mr. West had committed a specific
crime, the action taken by the officer -- delaying the traffic stop to await the arrival of a
drug dog -- was not the least intrusive means for investigating the officer's suspicions;
asking questions of Mr. West concerning drugs and the house that he recently left
would have been the appropriate next step to take in confirming or dispelling the
officer's suspicions. Because Officer Andreoli lacked reasonable articulable suspicion
that Mr. West had committed, or was about to commit, a specific crime at the time that

15

he extended the duration of the traffic stop, the district court erred in denying Mr. West's
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of that extension.
CONCLUSION
Mr. West respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment
of conviction, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this matter
to the district court for entry of an order suppressing all evidence obtained as a result of
the unlawful extension of the traffic stop.
DATED this 26 th day of July, 2012.

SPENCER J. HAHN
'-.-,,-.-,-~'
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
"
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